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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-ADOPTION AND AMENDMENT-RuilmANGEMENT NOT
A N:ew CoNSTITUTION.-A convention was authorized to propose revision,
alterations, or amendments to the existing state Constitution. After proposing several amendments which were adopted at popular elections, the
convention appointed a special committee to draft a rearrangement of the
Constitution and amendments. The reported rearrangement contained slight
changes of substance, while declaring that "Such Rearrangement shall not
be deemed * * * to change the meaning or effect of any part of the Constitution * * * as theretofore existing or operative." This Rearrangement was
adopted by the convention and ratified by the voters by a large majority.
Following an advisory opinion by the supreme court, the administrative
officials refused to publish the Rearrangement as the Constitution. On mandamus, held, the Rearrangement is not the state Constitution. Loring v.
Yeung, (Mass., I92I), 132 N. E. 65.
The law is well acquainted with judicial review of the method of adopting constitutional amendments. McCommghy v. Secy. of State, Io6 Minh.
392, and cases cited. Courts have taken cognizance of the possibility of
amendments contradictory in terms being adopted at the same election. In
re Senate File 3r, 25 Neb. 864; McBee v. Brady, 15 Ida. 761. But the solution of the conundrum, "When is a Constitution not a Constitution?" appears
to be unique. The reasoning in the instant case is somewhat elusive, but the
theory seems to be that the committee which drafted the Rearrangement,
the convention which adopted and submitted it to the people, and the sovereign people who voted for it did not intend to adopt a new Constitution
but merely a more or less convenient digest or index of the Q:mstitution of
178o and its sixty-six amendments. The absurdity of the result.would almost
answer the argument upon which it is based. Article 157, quoted above, is
somewhat ambiguous. The sensible and widely quoted rule of construction
was laid down by Lord Coke that each part of a statute should be construed
with reference to the other parts and with a view to the mischief it was
intended to remedy. Co. LIT., 38Ia. In applying this rule to Article 157
much help is found in the other sections. The document is entitled, "A
Constitution, or Form of Government." Article 158 declares that "1'his
form of government shall be * * * a part of the laws of the land." The first
sentence of Article 157 provides that the Constitution should thereafter be
published in such rearranged form. These provisions _seem consistent only
with the idea that a Constitution rather than a digest was intended. The
evil to be remedied was the clumsy a.'n'.d unintelligible form of the Constitution of 1780 with its sixty-six amendments which made many parts obsolete.
How this evil is to be remedied by a digest, which, in view of the changes
in substance, is not even accurate, is far front clear. The most plausible con-
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struction of the ambiguous part of Article 157 would be that provisions in
the Rearrangement should receive the same interpretation as similar provisio:ns in the Constitution of 178o had received. This obviously would not
apply to the instances of change in substance. In the last analysis, it must
be remembered that the source of all constitutional authority is the will of
the people, and it is submitted that the majority of the court displayed an
over-technical attitude toward the people's solemn pronouncement. See
Coor.EY ON CoNSTITUTIONAI. LIMITATIONS [7th Ed.], 9I and IOI, and DoDD ON
THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATE CONSTITUTIONS, !02.
CoNSTITUTIONAI. LAw-Du:e PROCESS-0P.ERATION oN PrusoNER WITHOUT
A HEARING.-Acts 1907, c. 2I5, authorized the board of managers of institutions intrusted with the care of defectives and confirmed criminals to perform an operation of vasectomy on an inmate, if deemed advisable to prevent procreation, but gave the inmate no opportunity to cross-examine the
experts who decided upon the operation, or to co:n:trovert their opinion.
Held, unconstitutional as denying due process of law. Williams et al. v.
Smith, (Ind., I921), 131 N. -E. 2.
It might be of interest to note that the operation of vasectomy (which
consists of ligating and resecting a small portion of the vas defere11s) was
performed for the first time in this country by Dr. H. C. Sharp on certain
convicts in the Indiana State Reformatory in 1899, and that the subsequent
statute in that state, here declared unconstitutional, was the first one of its
kind in the United States. The decision in the I;r{diana case is placed upon
the ground that the statute deprives the prisoner of his day in court, in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the federal Constitution, the
court citing Davis v. Berry, 2I6 Fed. 413, which held an Iowa statute uncon~
stitutional for the same reason. In the latter case, however, the statute was
a penal one, the operation being authorized on all criminals who had been
twice convicted of a felony, and the court declared it unconstitutional for
the further reason that it was a cruel and unusual punishment in violation
of the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. In this the case squarely
refused to follow State v. Feilen, 70 Wash. 65. In Michigan a statute (I
CoMP. L., 1915, Sec. 5176 et seq.) providing for sterilization of mentally
defective persons maintained wholly or in part by public expense was held
unconstitutional in Haynes v. Lapeer Circuit Judge, 201 Mich. 138, the court
saying:
"In this enactment the legislature selected out of what might be
termed a natural class of defective and incompetent persons only those
already under public restraint, leaving immune from its operation all
others of like kind to whom the reason for the legislative remedy is
normally and equally, at least, applicable, extending immunities and
privileg~s to the latter which are denied the former."
A similar statute was held unconstitutional in New Jersey for the same
reason. Smith v. Board of E~aminers, 85 N. J. Law, 46. The holding of
the principal case is right from the standpoint of law and fairness. The
:field of negative eugenics is a new one, and authorities are not agreed as to
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its doctrines. 5 JoUR. oF CRIM. LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, 5I4; 4 ibid. 326, 8o4If at the present time society believes it can better protect and preserve
itself by preventing the propagation of thPse whom it deems unlit, it should
at least be zealous to throw every possible constitutional safeguard around
the objects of its legislation. But as yet no case has gone to the root of the
matter. The few cases involving these statutes have been decided on purely
procedural grounds; fundamentals were not in issue. One is awaited with
interest which will weigh the various factors of public welfare and the
rights of the individual, together with the doctrines of science, and decide
fundamentally whether a state has a right to enforce such a statute. See
also 6 MICH. L. J ouR. 289, II MICH. L. Rmr. ISO, 12 ibid. 400, I3 ibid. I6o.
CoNS'tI'.l'U'l'IONAL LAw-VALIDI'.l'Y oF ra:e Nmm'ESN'.l'H AMENDMEN'l'.-On
a petition to strike the names of two female citizens from the registry of
voters, it was alleged that neither of them was entitled to register, as the
Constitution of Maryland confined suffrage to males, and that the Nineteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution providing for woman suffrage was invalid since it had never been "legally proposed, ratified or
adopted as a part of the Constitution"; and that it was "in excess of any
power to amend the Constitution."· Held, petition should be dismissed, as
the amendment is valid. Leser et al. v. Garnett et al., Board of Registry,
(Md., 192I), II4 Atl. 840.
In the instant case the Maryland Supreme Court, following the decision
of the federal Supreme Court in Hawke v. Smith, 253 U. S. 22I; Hawke v.
Smith, 253 U. S. 23I; Rhode Island v. Palmer (National Prohibition Cases),
253 U. S. 350, 386, holds that the states cannot impose limitations on the
amending power of the United States Constitution nor limit the rights of
legislatures or conventions to ratify a proposed amendment. The court
disposes of the argument that the amendment is not within the amending
power of the Constitution by referring to the Fifteenth Amendment, and
citing United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 2I4, and Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S.
370, to show the privilege of Congress to propose amendments forbidding
the United States or the several states from discriminating against any
class of its citizens in regard to their right to vote. The constitutionality
of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Amendments has been questioned before,
but their validity has been uniformly sustained in the federal com:ts. For
the men sitting on the Supreme Court of a state, or even of the United
States, to declare invalid an amendment submitted by a two-thirds vote of
both houses of Congress, and ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures, would certainly involve political consequences of a serious nature, for
a constitution based on the sovereignty of the people must enlist their supaiort to be effective. Unless they are willing to act through it, rather than
through some other mode of expression, it loses all force. The Constitution
must grow and expand with the nation or be cast aside. From a practical
standpoint, arid despite all fine-spun legal theory, it would seem that the
vast silent majority of the American people have the constitutional right to
change their own Constitution. Many authors have discussed the general
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subject, among them being the present Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court, writing in 29 YALE L. ]OUR. 821. For an opposing view, see
an article by J. D. White, 5 CoRNI'!f,L L. Q. u3. Although now chiefly of
academic interest, the bibliography of the subject may be found in a footnote in 19 MICH. L. R£v. 3 and 4.
CoNTRAC'tS-ASSIGNMENT oF RIGHTS.-The owners of certain patents
licensed the defendants to use the patented machine and agreed to give
them such advice as they needed respecting the mode of use of the machine.
The defendants agreed to use their best efforts to increase the sale of the
product and to pay certain royalties for the license. Later, the owners of
the patents assigned their rights under the patents to the plaintiff, subject
to the license of the defendants. The defendants refused to pay over the
royalties to the plaintiff, who brings action for the royalties due. Held, a
contract which involves personal services cannot be assigned in part and
abide in the original parties to it in part. Paper Products Machine Co. v.
Safepack Mills et al., (Mass., 1921), 131 N. E. 288.
The court in the principal case relies for. its decision mainly on the cases
of Delaware County Commissioners v. Diebold Safe and Lock Co., 133 U.
S. 473, and New England Cabinet Works v. Morris, 226 Mass. 246. But
these cases cannot be used as authorities to support this case. In Delaware
Cou11ty Commissioners v. Diebold Safe and Lock Co., there was attempted
an assignment both of rights and duties, and in addition the assignee tried
to recover more compensation than was due under the original contract.
Moreover, the part of the opinion in this case relied on by the court in the
principal case was merely dictum. In New England Cabinet Works v. Morris
there was also attempted an assignment both of rights and duties, while in
the principal case there was only an assignment of rights. The court here
fails to see that contracts are made up of rights and duties. That, although
it is true that duties cannot be assigned and that the assignee cannot be
compelled to perform them, yet if the assignor carries out the obligations,
even though they are of a non-delegable kind, the rights under the contract
can be assigned. This proposition is upheld by the great number of employment contract cases in which it has been decided that an assignment may
be made of wages to be earned in the future under an existing contract of
employment. Ka11e v. Clough, 36 Mich. 436; O'Keefe v. Alle1~, 20 R. I. 414;
Rodijkeit v. Andrews, 74 Oh. St. 104; Norton, Res., v. Whitehead, Adm.,
App., 84 Cal. 263. In fo r.e Wright, 157 Fed. 544, the court says:
"The fact that a contract for services involves personal trust and
confidence, and is therefore not assignable as an entirety, does not
prevent the assignability of rights arising out of such contract, as for
compensation earned thereunder, where the matter of personal confidence is not involved in such right."
See also 18 MICH. L. R£v. 285.
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CoNTRAC'l's-CoNSIDERA'.l'IoN-ADtQUACY.-The purchaser in a land contract which provided for forfeiture, being in arrears in his payments, purported to assign his equity, which amounted to approximately $300, to the
vendor in consideration of a cash payment of $5. In a suit in equity brought
to recover the amount paid on the contract in excess of the rental value of
the premises, held, that the assignment was ineffectual because the consideration for it was grossly inadequate. Beaden v. Bra1isford Realty Co.,
(Tenn., l9:n), 232 S. W. 958.
It is noteworthy that the court in the principal case seems to place its
decision squarely upon the ground of inadequacy of consideration pure and
simple. It is generally said that mere inadequacy is not a ground for interference in equity any more than it is at law. See POMEROY, EQtJITY Jt;RISPRUDtNc:E, [4th Ed.], §g26, citing many cases. Also, litdge v. Wilkins, 19
Ala. 765; Knabb v. Lindsay, 5 Ohio 469; Davidson v. Little, '22 Pa. St. 245.
It is sometimes said that the inadequacy may be so great as to raise a conclusive presumption of fraud. However, most of the cases in which this
statement is made will, on examination, be found to contain evidences of
other circumstances tending to justify equitable interference. See Priedential fosurance Co. v. LaChance, n3 Me. 550; Madison Co. v. The People. ex
rel., 58 Ill. 456; Byers v. Siirget, I9 How. (U. S.) 303; M orriso v. Philliber,
30 Mo. .I45. There is no doubt that gross inadequacy is evidence of fraud
in fact. Davidson v. Little, 22 Pa. St. 245; Morriso v. Philliber, 30 Mo. I45·
CoNTRAC'l'S-CONSIDERATION-DOING. WHAT 0Nt IS ALREADY UNDER CoNTRAC'l' To Do.-Where the parties to an employment contract entered into a
second agreement, differing from the first only in the amount of the compensation, held, second agreement enforcible upon a finding that there had been
an express, simultaneous rescission of the first contract. Schartzreich v.
Bauman-Basch, Inc., (N. Y., l92I), I3I N. E. 887.
The general rule is that a promise to perform, or performance of, what
one is already under contract to do, is not a sufficient consideration for a
promise of increased compensation or other additional benefit, since there
is neither detriment to the promisee nor benefit to the promissor. Harris v,
Watso1i, Peake 72; Frazer v. Hatton, 2 C. B. N. S. 5I2; Alaska Packers
Ass'n v. Domenico, II7 Fed. 99.; Phoenix fos. Co. v. Rink, no Ill. 538;
McQuaid v. Ba1tgh111an, I67 Ill. App. 430; Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewing Co., I03 Mo. 578; Shrfoer v. Craft, I66 Ala. I46. For complete list, see
WILI,IS'tON ON CoNTRAC'l'S, Sec. 130. The contrary view is followed in a
few jurisdictions, upon the ground that the new agreement is elected by the
promissor in place of an action for damages for refusal of proni.isee to perform the first contract,-Parrot v. Mexican Ry., 207 Mass. I84; Evans v.
Oregon & Wash. R. R. Co., 58 Wash. 429 (but see I6 MICH. L. Rsv. Io6);
or that the new contract is evidence of the abrogation of the old one and
that it is the same as if no previous contract had been made,-Coyner v.
Lynde, IO Ind. 282; Goebel v. Limi, 47 Mich. 489; Evans v. Oregon & Wash.
R.R. Co., 58 Wash. 429; Rollins v. Marsh-, 128 Mass. n6; or that the new
contract is an attempt to mitigate the damages flowing from the breach of
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the first,-Em!riss v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 49 Mich. 279· New York has followed the general rule in the later cases,-Weed v. Spears, 193 N. Y. 28g;
Kuhmarker Mfg. Co. v. Hills, 146 N. Y: Supp. 1013; and professes to follow
it in the principal case. The New York courts would not admit the competency of the second agreement impliedly to rescind the first,-Obrentz v.
Wesenfelcl, 103 N. Y. Misc. 664 (dictum), and principal case; nor would it
recognize a consideration in the second without a rescission of the first.
Vanderbilt v. Schreyer, 91 N. Y. 392; Obrentz v. Wesenfeld, 103 N. Y. Misc.
664; Price v. Press Pub. Co., 117 N. Y. App. Div. 854. But the court says
that although a rescission of the first contract is necessary to the finding of
a legal consideration in the second, yet it matters not whether such rescission is before or at the time of the making of the second agreement, so long
as it is express. It may, perhaps, be granted that a logical basis for finding
consideration would exist by virtue of this "simultaneous rescission," in
that promisee accepted a new contract in place of the old one, which might
be construed as legal detriment. But on broad policy there would seem to
be a weakness in the reasoning which found a legal detriment in the substitution of a right to $125 per month for a right to $go per month, and that
in essence is what it amounted to. Lingenfelder v. Wainwright Brewi11g
Co., 103 Mo. 578. Professor Williston, in his work on Contracts, gives
what would seem to be the best rule. To find a consideration in these cases
he would require that there be a moment of time when both parties are
freed of their obligations under the first contract, so that each of them
could refuse to enter into any bargain whatever relating to the same subject matter; for unless such a moment of time elapse, the total effect of the
second transaction is that one party promises to do exactly what he is
already 'contractually bound to do, and the other party promises to give an
additional compensation or bonus therefor. Wn.LIS'rON ON CoN'rRAC'rS,
Sec. 130.
CoN'tRAC'l's-CoNsm~'rloN-ItLUSORY PROMISt.-The plaintiff, a jobber,
desiring glue for resale only, contracted with the defendant, a glue manufacturer, to supply the plaintiff's "requirements" of a certain quality of
glue for one year. In a suit for failure to supply, it was held, that the contract was void for lack of mutuality. Oscar Schlegel Mfg. Co. v. Peter
Cooper's Glue Factory, (N. Y., 1921), 132 N. E. 148.
In such cases the mutuality of consideration depends on the meaning
given the word "requirements,'' the court in the principal case interpreting
it as "that which is demanded." Thus, it was pointed out that the plaintiff
had not obligated itself to do more than what it wanted to do. A similar
result was reached where the plaintiff, a foundry concern, contracted with
the defendant to supply all the pig iron "wanted" by plaintiff in its business.
Bailey et al. v. Austria1i, 19 Minn. 535. On the other hand, where the vendee
was engaged in a business requiring the article contracted for, the contract
has often been upheld on another interpretation of "requirements," viz.,
express or implied promises to take what was actually needed in the business.
Wells v. Alerandre, 130 N. Y. 642; E. G. Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., 128
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Mich. 591; Minn. Lmnber Co. v. The Whitebreast Coal Co., 16o Ill. 85;
Nat. Furnace Co. v. Keystone Mfg. Co., no Ill. 427; Manhattan Oil Co. v.
Richardso1i Liebricating Co., II3 Fed. 923; Jenkins & Co. v. Anaheim Sugar
Co., 247 Fed. 958, noted in IS MICH. L. ruv. 441; Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222
N. Y. 88. As to the quantity which the vendee may require from the vendor,
some courts have allowed increases over the usual demands when such
increases were within the "legitimate requirements of the business." E. G.
Dailey Co. v. Clark Can Co., supra; N. Y. Cent. Iron Works Co. v. U. S.
Radiator C<J., 174 N. Y. 33I. In the last case the court denied that the
vendee should be allowed to use the contractl in a speculative manner, asserting that the increase should be for the "ordinary and regular business pur;POSes." At the same time, it was admitted that the "needs of the vendee
could be indefinitely enlarged when the market was in such a condition as
to enable it to undersell its competitors because of the favorable contract
with the vendor." Just where the line should be drawn depends largely on
the circumstances of each case, and certainly in the principal case the court
arrived at an equitable result, though not proceeding on the grounds of certain other courts. For further discussion of this problem, see 18 MICH. L.
ruv. 409.
CoNTRACTS-lLr.EGALITY-R.lGHTS oF !NNOcENT PROMlSF;~-An order promulgated under the Defense of the Realm Act prohibited the purchase and
sale of linseed oil by one who had not procured a license. P, who had a
license, contracted to sell linseed oil to D, being induced to do so through
D's false representations to the effect that he (D) also had a license. In
an action by P to recover the amount of an award of damages for breach
of contract, made by arbitrators, held, that the contract was illegal and that
no claim under it could be enforced by anyone in a court of law. Mahmoud
and Ispahani, In re, [1921], 2 K. B. 716.
While it is often said that an illegal contract is void, it may well be
doubted whether this statement is strictly accurate. It would seem to be
more nearly correct to say that such a contract is unenforcible at t..lie suit
of one who participated in the wrongdoing. Lord Mansfield put the matter
thus:
"The principle of public policy is this: ex dolo 1nalo non orit!lr
actio. No court will lend its aid to a man who founds his cause of
action upon an immoral or an illegal act." Holman v. Johnson, Cowp.
34I, 343.
To the same effect, see Gibbs & Sterrett Mfg. Co. v. Brucker, UI U. S. 597.
Thall a promisee who is justifiably innocent may recover damages for breach
of an agreement that is illegal on grounds of public policy has frequently
been decided. Millward v. Littlewood, 5 Ex. 775; Kelley v. Riley, 106 .Mass.
.339; Waddell v. Wallace, .32 Okla. 140; Carter v. Ri1iker, I74 Fed. 882; Musson v. Fales, 16 Mass. 331. No reason is apparent why the same rule should
not be applied in the .case of an aireement made illegal by statute in the

RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS

107

absence of an express provision making the contract void. In support of
this view, see Bloxsome v. Williams, 3 B. & C. 232; G11ibs & Sterrett Mfg.
Co. v. Brncker, supra; McCardie, J., in Brightman & Co. v. Tate, [1919],
I K. B. 463, 472.
CoNTRAC'l'S-THIRD PAR'l.'Y BENEFICIARY IN MICHIGAN.-Plaintiff's mother
was dead. After considerable talk between plaintiff's father and Miss Carpenter, testatrix herein, it was agreed, in 1868, by the father that she should
take plaintiff to live with her. It was agreed ·by Miss Carpenter that she
would board, clothe and educate plaintiff until he was of age, and would
give him everything she owned when she was through with it. Plaintiff was
consulted, and consented. He was then seven years of age. He lived with
Miss Carpenter until his marriage, and for the many years thereafter until
her death gave her the care and attention of a son. She died in 1919, testate,
having given all her property to others than the plaintiff, the bulk of it to
the American Baptist Publication Society. Plaintiff brought this bill, asking
specific performance of the above contract, and that he be decreed owner
of all the realty and personalty of which Miss Carpenter died· seized and
possessed. Held, plaintiff was a party to the contract and to the consideration, and since the contract had been fully performed on his part is entitled
to specific performance. Bassett v. American Baptist P1tblication Society,
(Mich., 1921), 183 N. W. 747.
The court specifically denies that it is giving relief to a third party
beneficiary, but states that there was such privity of contract between Miss
Carpenter, plaintiff's father and plaintiff as to entitle plaintiff to maintain
this suit, citing Preston v. Preston, 207 Mich. 681. See 18 MICH. L. R.i>v. 58.
Preston v. Preston, supra, and the Michigan decisions on third party beneficiary cases in general are very fully reviewed in 18 MICH. L. Riw. ~18.
Cru:MEs-SuFF1cmNCY oF INDIC'l'MENT.-Defendant was indicted under a
statute prohibiting the placing of anything "on any railroad in this state
calculated to obstruct, overthrow or direct from the track of such railroad
any car," etc. The indictment alleged the placing upon the "tract" of the
railroad of an obstruction calculated "to overthrow and direct from the
track'' the cars, etc. The lower court entered a judgment on a demurrer
to the indictment. Held, the use of "tract" instead of "track'' did not render
the indictment bad, and the judgment should be reversed. State v. Warfield,
(Md., 1921), II4 Atl. 835.
The court put its opinion on two grounds; first, that the statute prohibited placing obstructions on the "railroad," not specifically on the track
thereof, and that "on the tract" was a proper allegation; second, that if
"tract" were really intended to be "track," and was a mere mistake in spelling, such mistake could mislead no one. It is regrettable that such obviously harmless error can still be even thought of as
defense; but the
decision is a relief from those such as Evans Y. State, 34 Tex. Cr. no, to
the effect that the use of "possion" instead of "possession" rendered the
indictment bad, despite its obvious contextual meaning; or Commonwealth

a
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v. M cLoott, 5 Gray (Mass.) 91, quashing an indictment because "A. D." was
omitted from the date; or Harwell v. State, 22 Tex. App. 251, to the effect
that a written verdict of "guity" is not equivalent to one of "guilty." There
seems to be developing a much fairer interpretation of what the court in
West brook v. State, - Tex. Cr. App. -, 227 S. W. no4, calls "the sensible
proposition that incorrect grammar, bad spelling, bad handwriting, the use
of words not technically in their correct sense or places will none of them
make an indictment bad unless same causes the thing intended to be
charged to lack of sense or certainty."
CRIMINAL LAw-Evm1wcE-lLLEGAL SEARCH AND Sm:zURE.-Defendant
was convicted of violation of the state liquor law upon evidence obtained
under a search warrant conforming to an unconstitutional search and seizure
law. Before trial a demand was made for the return of the property seized
and an application for an order directing its return was denied. Held, conviction should be set aside. People v. Le Vasseur (Mich., 1921), I82 N. W. 60.
The unconstitutionality of the statute in question (Act No. 53, Sec. 25,
P. A. I9I9) was decided in People v. De La Mater, (Michr, l92I), 182 N.
W. 57. In the instant case the Michigan court shows no disposition to
question the doctrine laid down in People v. Marxhaiuen, 204 Mich. 559,
which followed the respectable, though often questioned, authority of Boyd
v. United States, n6 U. S. 6!6, and Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383,
L. R. A., l9I5 B, 834 See I9 MICH. L. Rsv. 355, and 9 ILL. L. Rsv. 43.
When the objection is first made at the trial the cases are agreed that the
evidence is admissible, no matter how obtained, partly, at least, on the
theory that the court will not halt the trial to determine collateral matters.
Adams l· New York, I92 U. S. '585; People v. Aldorfer, I64 Mich. 676. It
may be suggested, however, that the court does exactly that whenever the
admissibility of evidence depends upon a collateral question; e. g., whether a
confession offered in evidence is free and voluntary. It would seem, if the
chief concern is to protect the defendant's constitutional rights rather than
to determine his innocence or guilt, that the question might be raised at any
time. As was well said by the Supreme Court of Kansas :
"The federal Constitution was not framed for the special protection of those who violate statutes, but for the good of the entire
citizenship." State v. Missouri Pac. Ry., g6 Kan. 6og.
It is submitted that the defendant's proper remedy is not immunity from
punishment for crime, but a civil action against the trespassing officers. For
a full discussion and large collection of cases, see WIGMORS ON EVIDENCE,
§2264. See also supra, p. 93.
CRIMINAL LAW-MISTAKE OF FACT AS A DEFENSE-BIGAMY.-Defendant
was indicted for bigamy under a statute providing that whoever, being married, shall marry another person during the life of the former husband or
wife shall be guilty of a felony, unless at the time of the second marriage
the defendant has obtained a divorce. The defendant, without having
obtained a divorce, married again during the life of his former wife. As a
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defense, the defendant set up that he had reasonable grounds to believe, and
did believe in good faith, that a divorce had been secured. Held, no defense.
The defendant did the act prohibited by the statute and is guilty of the
crime without regard to his good faith in contracting the second marriage.
Re:1: v. Wheat, [1921], 2 K. B. n9.
The majority of American courts follow the rule as laid down in the
principal case. People v. Spoor, 235 !11. 230; Russell v. State, 66 Ark. 185;
7 CORPUS Jurus, page n65, and cases there cited. In several American jurisdictions, however, where the statute is practically identical with the English
statute, it is held that a bona fide belief on reasonable grounds that a divorce
had been granted. is a defense. Squire v. State, 46 Ind. 459; Baker v. State,
86 Neb. 775. These jurisdictions hold that the statute must be interpreted
in the tight of the common law rule that before there can be a crime there
must be a guilty mind, and if one is reasonably misled by circumstances
which, if true, would make the act for which the prisoner is indicted an
innocent act, he is not guilty. This general principle is laid down in Qi1eeii
v. Tolson, [1889], 23 Q. B. Div. 168, but the court in the principal case
refused to follow it on the ground that it was not in point. In that case
the defendant was indicted for bigamy under the same statute, to which
there was a proviso that the act did not include any person whose husband
or wife had been continually absent from home for seven years and was
not known by such person to have been living within that time. Defendant's
husband had been away from home for less than seven years; but the defendant, thinking her husband to be dead, married again. Defendant's
former husband was in fact alive at the time. Upon indictll)ent the court
held the defendant not guilty because she bona fide and reasonably believed
her husband dead. Defendant came clearly within the words of the statute,
because she did marry before her former husband was in fact dead, or
before she could legally consider him dead. But the court in the principal
case said that the defendant in Qi1een v. Tolson, supra, did not intend to
do the act prohibited by the statute, because she believed on reasonable
grounds that her husband was dead, while the defendant in the principal case
did intend to do the act prohibited by the statute, regardless of his good
faith in contracting the second marriage. The distinction is difficult to see.
CRIMINAL LAw-M1s'l'An oP FAC'l' AS A D.mmNs&-CRIMINAL INTENT.The Larceny Act of 1861 provides that "Whosoever shall unlawfully and
wilfully kill * * * any house dove or pigeo,n under such circumstances as
shall not amount to larceny at common law" shall be liable to a penalty.
D admitted the killing, but stated in his answer that, when he shot it, he
thought the pigeon was a wild one which he might lawfully kill. Held,
admitting statement of D to be true, it is no defense. Horton v. Gwymz,e,
[1921], 2 K. B. 661.
The general rule is that evil intent is requisite to make an act criminal,
and mistake of fact, if honest and reasonable, is a good defense. 1 BISHOP
CRIM. LAW, Sec. 301; BISHOP, S'l'A'l'U'tORY Clu?iuis, Secs. 132, 1022. The only
serious exception to this rule is in the case of acts mala prohibita, where,
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in the exercise of the police powers of the state, the legislature enacts a
statute, for the protection of the public health, welfare or morals, merely
prohibiting an othenvise lawful act without reference to intent. ·Even in
such cases some courts read "knowingly" into the statute and permit the
defense of mistake of fact. Gordon v. State, s2 Ala. 3o8; Sqnire v. State, 46
Ind. 4S9; Stem v. State, S3 Ga. 229; Farrell v. State, 32 Oh. St. 4s6; Reg. v.
Sleep, 8 Cox C. C. 472. However, the trend of modern authority is towards a
literal interpretation of such statutes. People v. Johnson, 288 Ill. 442; Com. v.
Mixer, 207 Mass. 14r, 31 L. R. A. (N. S.) 467; Welch v. State, r4s Wis. 86;
People v. D'Antonio, ISON. Y. App. Div. IOQ; Walters v. State, 174 Ind. 54s;
People v. Hatinger, 174 Mich. 333. See also Re~ v. Wheat, [1921], 2 K. B.
n9, and the note thereon, sitpra. But where the legislature uses the word
"knowingly," "wilfully," or some other word of similar import, the cases
appear to be uniform in requiring proof of guilty intent and permitting
mistake of fact to excuse. Com. v. Flamielly, Sr Mass. 195; Masters v. U.
S., 42 D. C. App. 3so; State v. Snyder, 44 Mo. App. 429; Verona Central
Cheese Co. v. Mttrtaitgh, so N. Y. 314; Brown v. State, 137 Wis. 543; Brow1i
v. State, 43 Tex. 478; Bo11ke1· v. People, 37 Mich. 4- That the word "wilfully" as employed in statutory criminal law necessarily implies a guilty
mind, see Withers v. Steamboat El Paso, 24 Mo. 204; Browi~ v. State, 137
Wis. 543; Masters v. U. S., sitpra; Kendall v. State, 9 Ga. App. 794- In
reversing the decision of the justices in the instant case, the court say in
effect that because the killing was not accidental and D admittedly shot
intending to kill that particular bird, the act was both 'wilful and unlawful."
'!'he dictim~ in, one case was the only authority cited. Taylor v. N ewinan, 4
E. & S. 89. There P's pigeons were in the habit of feeding on D's crops,
and D, after giving P warning, shot one of them while so feeding, believing
he had a right to do so. As a conviction was quashed in that case, Judge
Mellor saying, "I think that it was not intended to apply to a case in which
there was no guilty mind, and where the act was done by a person under
the honest belief that he was exercising a right,'' it is at least doubtful
authority for the conclusion arrived at by the court in the instant case. It
is submitted that neither reason nor authority justifies the strict view taken
by the court in refusing to admit mistake of fact, with the usual qualifications, as a defense. The statute is not in the nature of a police regulation
designed in the interest of the public, and it expressly gives scope to the
criminal intent.
CRIMINAL LAw-TruAr.s-RJ,:coMMltNDA'tION o-P Mimcv.-An Ohio statute
(Gen. Code, Sec. ·12,400) provides that "whoever * * * kills another is guilty
of murder in the first degree and shall be punished by death unless the jury
trying the accused recommend mercy, in which case the punishment shall
be imprisonment in the penitentiary during life." In a prosecution for murder in the first degree the court charged the jury "to consider and determine
whether or not, in view of all the circumstances and facts leading ttP to and
attending tne alleged homicide as discfosed by the evidence, you should or
:;hould not make such recommendation." The charge was objected to on
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the ground that in the portion italicized the court invaded the function of
the jury. On error, it was held (Robinson and Wanamaker, J]., dissenting)
that the instruction was proper. Howell v. State, (Ohio, 1921), 131 N. E. 7o6.
The dissenting judges took the view that by the action of the legislature
there had been vested in the jury, so far as choice between punishment by
death and life imprisonment was concerned, a discretion wholly unlimited
and beyond the court's control. They also disagreed with the majority in
the interpretation of Winsto1i v. ·united States, 172 U. S. 303, 19 Sup. Ct. 212,
43 L. Ed. 456, a case much relied upon in the prevailing opinion, and in which
are to be found pronouncements favoring each side. The weight of authority
is probably with the court's decision. Inma1i v. State, 72 Ga. 269; D1mca1i
v. State, 141 Ga. 4; State v. Bates, 87 S. C. 431; State v. Carrigan, (N. J.),
I08 Atl. 315. Squarely opposed to the prevailing view is Vickers v. United
States, l Okl. Cr. 452. Among the cases that may be cited as supporting the
dissent, but which are found on close examination to be either mere dictum
or standing merely for the doctrine that the court must not attempt to tell
the jury how to exercise their discretion, are People v. Kamamm, no Cal.
609 (see People v. Ross, 134 Cal. 256; People v. Rogers, 163 Cal. 476);
State v. Thome, 39 Utah 2o8 (see State v. Mewhinney, 43 Utah 135); State
v. Ellis, g8 Oh. St. 21. Since the judge in cases where the legislature has
fixed only minimum and maximum penalties exercises an uncontrollable and
unreviewable discretion in passing sentence, it is reasonably arguable that
the jury in such a situation as was presented in the principal case should
have a like freedom: if the judge in the former case may be guided in
fixing sentence by what has come to him, let us say, in a vision, why should
the jury in the latter case be confined to the facts and circumstances of the
case as disclosed by the evidence?
INSURAN<:i;-E:e~cr oF D~TH oF INSUR$> Bin'orut Tim Pwon SPEcmnm
BY TH£ "INCONTESTADU.ITY" Cr.AUSE ExPIRES.-An insurance policy read:
"This policy shall be incontestable after one year from its date except for
non-payment of premiums." The insured died within the year. Action wm
brought on the policy and the insurer defended, alleging false warranties
of the insured in answering questions material to the risk. The answer was
not filed until after one year from the date of the policy. Plaintiff contended
that the defense was barred by the operation of the above clause. Defendant
contended that the rights of the parties became fixed at the death of the
insured, and since the policy was then contestable it should continue so indefinitely; hence, false warranties should avoid the policy. Held, admitting the
existence of fraud, the clause continued operative after the death of the
insured, the time within which to contest the policy had expired, and plaintiff
may recover. Plotner v. Northwestern National Life Insurance Co., (N. D.,
1921), 183 N. w. IOOO.
The question involved is nearly new. It is well settled that the "incontestable" clause will bind the insurer even in the face of fraud if the period
stipulated has run before the death of the insured. See cases cited in 6 A.
L. R. 448. But when, as in the principal case, the insured dies before the
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period expires, there are two possible conclusions, first, that the clause con.
tinues operative, thus compelling the insurer to contest the policy within the
agreed period if at all, or second, that the rights of all the parties to the
contract become fixed and determined at the death of the insured, and if
the policy is then contestable it will remain so indefinitely. Authority in
point is meagre, but that which exists clearly favors the former alternative.
In Priulential !11.surance Co. v. Lear, 31 App. D. C. 184, the insured died
within the stipulated period. In discussing the case the court used language
which clearly indicated that in their minds the clause continued operative
after his death. However, the decision for the plaintiff did not turn on the
point, for the defendant failed in his proof of fraud. In Monahan v. Metropolitan Li{e Insurance Co., 180 Ill. App. 390, the appellate court adopted the
second alternative and held that the rights of the parties became fixed as
they stood at the death of the insured. However, this ruling was reversed
when the case reached the Illinois Supreme Court (n9 N. E. 68), the court
saying that to limit the operation of the incontestability clause by requiring
the agreed period to expire during the life of the insured, if at all, was
unwarrantably to read additional words into the policy. Recently, in Ramsey v. Old Colotiy Life Inrnrance C-0., (Ill., 1921), 131 N. E. 108, the earlier
supreme court decision was followed, and it may now be regarded as settled
law in Illinois that the incontestability clause continues operative no matter
when the insured may die. In Ebner v. Ohio St<tf:e Life Insurance Co.,
(Ind.), 121 N. E. 315, the same question arose upon a bill in equity for
cancellation of a policy. for fraud brought by the insurer after the death
of the insured, but two days before the expiration of the period stipulated.
The court in decreeing cancellation said that although ordinarily a bill in
equity would not lie after the death of the insured because the insurer had
an adequate defense at law to an action on the policy, yet in this case the
remedy at law was not adequate because the incontestability period was still
running. The beneficiary might not sue on the policy until after the stipulated period had expired. So this case necessarily supports the Illinois
decisions and in addition the court expressly cites them with approval.
''Incontestability" clauses are becoming increasingly numerous. They make
good selling arguments for insurance agents. Furthermore, they are now
required by statute in many states. It is to be expected that more cases in
point will soon appear. A reasonable construction of the plain words of
such clauses demands that the conclusion of the principal case prevail unless
the clause expressly provides that the agreed period shall run its course
during the lifetime of the insured.
LAW OF NATIONS-CONFISCATION OF ENEMY PRIVATE PROPE:RTY-\VHE:N
UsAGE DE:VEI.OPS INTO BINDING CusToM.-After the conclusion of the armistice between Great Britain and Bulgaria, an inquisition was held and
certain stocks and securities belonging to Ferdinand, former Tsar of Bulgaria, were declared forfeited to the Crown. Ferdinand appealed. Held,
that the Crown has the right, under the common law, to seize and forfeit
enemy private property found within the realm, but that this common law
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right has been superseded by the Trading with the Enemy Acts. In re
Ferdinand, ex-Tsar of Bulgaria, [1921], I Ch. 107.
The derivation of a rule from modern international usage had more
to commend it in this case than in The Marie Le01ilza;dt, infra. The usage
had developed over a longer period and with more uniformity. Beginning
at least as early as the sixteenth century, the rule that enemy private property within the country is subject to confiscation was gradually mitigated.
Through municipal legislation, treaties, and common usage the practice
developed of permitting enemies to remove, dispose of, or retain their property. There was no important instance of confiscation during the century
which preceded the World War. There was also an impressive accumulation of theoretical opinion, including most Europ~an writers, in support of
the alleged rule against confiscation. See CORBETT, LEADING CASES, [3rd Ed.],
II, 61-2. The attitude of the courts, however, remained conser\.ative. The
old rule was asserted as late as the end of the seventeenth century. Attorney-General v. Weeden, (1699), Parker 267. At tne beginning of the nineteenth century it was doubted whether the usage, apart from statute or
treaty, had actually developed into a binding custom. Jolmso1i v. TwentyOne Bales, (1814), 13 Fed. Cas. 855. It was held by the Supreme Court of
the United States that war does not of itself work a confiscation, but said
that war gives the right to confiscate. Brow1i v. United States, (I8I4), 8
Cr. no. Lord Ellenborough's decision in Wiolff v. Oxholm, (I8I7), 6 M.
& S. 92, holding the Danish confiscatory ordinance contrary to the law of
nations and void, was certainly anomalous and probably unsound from every
point of view. In the twentieth century the outstanding event in this connection was the return to earlier practice in the treaties of peace at the end
of the World War. See GARNER, !N'l'. LAW AND 'tHE WoRLD WAR, I, ch. 4;
SCHUSTER, THE PEACE TREATY IN ITS EFFECTS ON PRIVATE PROPERTY, BRITISH
YEAR BooK OF !NT. LAW (I920-21), I67. The instant case concedes living
force to the same harsh principle. · It has been assailed as reactionary and
dangerous. See 30 YALE L. JouR. 845. But could the court safely have done
otherwise than take the conservative position? While a supernational tribunal, had one existed, might well have derived a rule from modern international usage, it is not apparent that a national court under such circumstances can be expected to adventure so advanced a decision. Does not the
criticism misconceive the function of national courts? See PICCIOTTO, RELATION OF INT. LAW TO 'tHE LAW OF ENGLAND AND OF 'tH:E UNIT:ED STATES, ch. 5
and passim.
LAW OF NA'.UONS-EFFECT OF CONCLUSION OF PEAC:E ON PROPERTY SUBJECT
To CONDEMNATION AS PRIZE-STATUS oF FREE CITY OF DANZIG.-At the outbreak of the war between Great Britain and Germany, three ships belonging
to a Danzig corporation were seized as prize in British ports. Upon the
conclusion of peace, the treaty reserved to the allied powers the right to
retain and liquidate the property of German nationals within their territories, "including territories ceded to them by the present treaty," with a
proviso that "German nationals who acquire ipso facto the nationality of
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an allied or associated power in acdordance with the provisions of the present
treaty, will not be considered as German nationals." TREATY OF VERSAILLES,
Part X, s. rv, art. 297, para. (b). The treaty also ceded the territory of
Danzig to the principal allied and associated powers to be constituted a Free
City. Part III, s. XI, arts. IOO-Io8. The Danzig owners of the ships asked
restoration and compensation, contending that they were not to be considered German nationals within the meaning of the treaty provisions. Held,
that the ships must be condemned. Apart from the treaty, the conclusion
9f peace and the transfer of the claimants' allegiance to the Free City of
Danzig did not revest property which became subject to condemnation during
the war. The claimants were German nationals within the meaning of the
treaty provisions. The Blonde and Other Ships, [192I], P. 155.
As regards neutral vessels captured during war, it has been a moot question whether they may be condemned after the conclusion of peace. Compare 0PPENHEn.r, INT. LAW, 2d ed., II, 436, and The Doelwyk, Martens, No1tvea1' Recueil General, 2d Ser., XXVIII, 66, 85 (Italy, 1896). Enemy vessels,
on the other hand, can hardly escape the decree of condemnation because
peace has intervened. The Blonde, supra.; I :K:eNT, COMMENTARIES, 173.
Nor does there appear to be any good reason for differentiating the case
of German claimants who have become subjects of the Free City of Danzig
from the case of those who have remained subjects of Germany. The
Marie Leonhardt, [192I], P. I. Furthermore, as a matter of treaty interpretation, it seems clear that the claimants were not German nationals who
had acquired ipso facto the nationality of an allied or associated power.
But the court went on to support its interpretation by emphasizing the
notion that Danzig has been constituted "a new sovereign power'' with an
international status independent of Poland. This is the merest fiction.
While it has been asserted on behalf of the allied and associated powers
that the inhabitants of Danzig "form no part of the Polish state" (13 AM.
JouR. INT. LAW, 545, 549), the Treaty of Versailles (Art. 1o8), nevertheless,
anticipates that Poland, in addition to its control of commerce and transportation, will "undertake the conduct of the foreign relations of the Free
City of Danzig as well as the diplomatic protection of citizens of the City
when abroad." If the court desired to consider the international status of
Danzig, it ought to have given due weight to these facts.
LAW OF NATIONS-ENEMY ~RCHANT SHIPS IN PORT AT OUTBREAK OF
WAR-WHEN USAGE DEVELOPS INTO BINDING CusToM.-A German steamship
was seized in the port of London at the outbreak of war. Aftet the conclusion of peace the owners claimed the release of the ship on the ground
that there is a customary rule of the law of nations, binding on prize courts,
which requires a belligerent to allow enemy merchant ships within its ports
at the outbreak of war a reasonable period of time in which to depart. Held,
that enemy merchant ships in port at the outbreak of war are liable to seizure
and condemnation as prize. The Marie Leonhardt, [1921], P. I.
Usage is an important source of the law of nations as recognized and
applied by the courts. The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677. But when, to
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borrow the figure- of Pitt Cobbett, does a random route across a common
acquire the character of an acknowledged path? When does usage crystallize into binding custom? The answer was not difficult in the principal case.
In 1782 Lord Mansfield had asserted the rule to be that "upon the declaration of war, or hostilities, all the ships of the enemy are detained in our
ports, to be confiscated as the property of the enemy, if no reciprocal agreement is made." Lindo v. Rodney, 2 Doug. 612 n., 615 n. Subsequently, the
usage of nations became somewhat more lenient. Upon the outbreak of the
Crimean War in 1854, the belligerent governments allowed liberal periods
in which enemy merchant ships in their ports might depart without hindrance. See The Plzamix, Spink's P. C. l. A similar practice was observed
at the beginning of each of the principal wars of the ensuing half century.
Thus, the United States granted thirty days at the outbreak of the war with
Spain, liberally construed in the case of Tlze Buena Ventura, 175 U. S. 384As regards details, however, the practice was not unifonn. And the granting
of a period seems to· have been commonly regarded as an act of grace. An
attempt to agree upon a common rule at The Hague in 1907 was unsuccessful. Great Britain, France, Japan, and the Argentine voted against a proposal to recognize the usage as obligatory. The convention drafted was an
unsatisfactory compromise. It was never signed by the United States. See
HIGGINS, THE HAGUE PEACE CoNFSRENCES, 295-307. At the beginning of the
World War the granting of a period depended in most instances upon reciprocal agreement. There was no uniformity as regards either the principle
or the details of its application. See GARNER, INT. LAW AND THE WORLD
WAR, I, ch. 6. "There was thus an inchoate usage of exemption, although
it was not either sufficiently uniform or sufficiently long established to rank
as an obligatory custom." COBBETT, LEADING CASES, [3rd Ed.], II, 167.
LAW OF NATIONS-NATIONAUTY-STATEI.ESSNESS.-The plaintiff was discharged from German nationality in 18¢. He settled in England, but was
never naturalized, nor did he ever acquire nationality in any other country.
He sued for a declaration that he was not a German national within the
meaning of treaty clauses providing that the property of German nationals
might be charged with the payment of certain claims. Held, that he was
entitled to the declaration. "Statelessness" is recognized in English municipal law. Semble, that it is recognized in the law of nations. Stoeck v. Public Trustee, [I921], 2 Ch. 67.
Whether the status of no nationality is recognized in 'English municipal
law has been questioned but never before decided. A few years ago Lord
Phillimore seems to have doublled whether such a status had been recog~ized in any system of law. Ex parte Weber, [1916], l K B. 28o, 283. In
the same case the House of Lords left the question open. [I9I6], l A. C. 42I.
No cases have been found on the point in American reports. See HuBERICH,
TRADING WITH THE EN£MY, 86-9. Whether the status is conceivable from
the point of view of the law of nations has been controverted. See BORCHARD, DIPI.OMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD, II, 262; OPPENHEIM,
INT. LAw, [3rd Ed.], I, 3II-13. Assuming that the court was justified in
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finding, from the evidence in the case, that the plaintiff had lost his German
nationality for all purposes, the decision that he was "stateless" in English
law seems to have been fully warranted by the logic of the situation. The
dictum that "statelessness" is recognized in the law of nations will be generally approved.
MASTER AND S:eitvANT-MAsT:eit's DuTY To PRovmi> SAFE INSTRUMENT.ALI'l'IES-DEFECTIVJ> MOTOR CAR SUPPLIED FOR Us-e OF S:eitvANT.-The plaintiff,
an employe of the defendant, was given an automobile for use in his master's business. The starting mechanism of the car was defective. Plaintiff
complained, but nothing was done. Plaintiff remained in the defendant's
employment and continued to use the automobile. While attempting to crank
the car the plaintiff was injured. It was contended that he had assumed the
risk. Held, that plaintiff had not necessarily assumed the risk by remaining
in the defendant's employment :after learning of the defect. It was a question for the jury. Baker v. James Brothers & Son.s, [192I]. 2 K B. 6g4
The early English rule held that a servant who continued to work after
knowledge of the risk lost his right to sue for resulting injury. Griffiths v.
London & St. Katharine Docks Cc., (I884), I3 Q. B. 259. The modern
English rule holds that knowledge of the risk does not necessarily require,
as a conclusion· of law, that the servant assumes the risk, but it is a question
for the jury. S11iith v. Baker, (I8g1), L. R., 16 App. Cases 325; Baker v.
James Brothers & Sons, supra. The majority of American courts follow
the early English rule. Lamson v. American Axe Co., (1900), I77 Mass. 144;
Kansas City, M. & 0. Ry. Co. v. Lopsley, (1907), 76 Kan. 103; Santiago v.
Walsh Stevedore Co., (1912), 137 N. Y. Supp. 6u. The North Carolina
court, however, follows the present English doctrine. Lloyd v. Hanes & Co.,
(1900), 126 N. C. 359. Professor Bohlen states this to be the only court
following Smith v. Baker in America. See 20 HARV. L. REY. no. The modern
English doctrine of treating the question as one of fact for the jury appeals
more to one's sense of justice.
I

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ORDINANCES-QUESTIONING VALIDITY BY MANDAMUS.-A city ordinance provided that no one should carry on the business of selling jewelry within the city unless he first obtain a license from
the mayor. No rules or directions were laid down for the guidance of the
mayor, except that he should require a certain bond of the applicant. Plaintiff applied for such license, which was refused. He then applied for mandamus to compel the issuance of the license, and also denied the validity
of the ordinance. Held, two justices dissenting, the question of constitutionality was not before the court, and the ordinance gives the mayor full
discretion to grant or not to grant such license; hence, a writ of mandamus
should not be granted. Samuels v. Couzens, (Mich., 1921), I83 N. W. 925.
The ordinance attempts the regulation of a business which may be carried on as a matter of right, and which the city could not entirely prohibit.
As interpreted by the court, it gives the mayor full discretion to grant or
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refuse a license and does not lay down the conditions by which he shall be
governed. It would seem, therefore, very clearly unconstitutional, as denying the equal protection of the laws, and therefore conflicting with the Fourteenth Amendment, or as being a delegation of legislative power. Yick W o
v. H-0pki11s, 118 U. S. 356; Walsh v. City of Denver, II Colo. App. 523;
Smith v. Hosford, Io6 Kan. 363; City of Richmond v. House, I77 Ky. 8I4;
Commonwealth v. Maletsky, 203 Mass. 24I; F~UND, Por.ICS PowsR, 667-670.
In Matter of Frazee, 63 Mich. 3g6, the court held an unregulated discretion
in the mayor, to permit or prohibit parades on the streets, invalid. But, as
the plaintiff asks relief under the ordinance, he cannot question its validity
in this action. The cases are all but unanimous on this point. Mandamus
cases in which the relator is permitted to raise the question of constitutionality are those wherein he attacks another statute which, if valid, would
excuse the respondent from performance. Von Hoffmat~ v. Quincy, 4 Wall.
535; Giddings v. Secretary of State, 93 Mich. I. Hence, if plaintiff wishes
to test the validity of the ordinance, he should go ahead with his business
and get himself arrested and fined ! The method is harsh, wasteful of time
and money, and unfair to the party, but the law now offers him nothing better. Flick v. City of Broke1i Bow, 67 Neb. 529. The Michigan Declaratory
Judgment Law, Act No. I50, P. A, I9I9, might have given plaintiff an adequate and efficient remedy, Dyson v. Atty. Gm., [I9II], I K. B. 4Io, but it
has been declared unconstitutional. Anway v. Grand Rapids Ry. Co., 211
Mich. 592. See I6 MICH. L. REv. 69; I7 MICH. L. REv. 688. I9 MICH. L. REv.
· 86. I9 MICH. L. REv. 537 discusses a similar statute now in effect in Kansas.
However, even though plaintiff in the instant case could not insist that the
constitutional question be considered, the court may indulge in such consideration when the invalidity is clear, although neither party can, or does, insist
thereon. Welch v. Swasey, I93 Mass. 364; State v. Robins, 71 Ohio St. 273.
And if, as the court insisted, this be prevented by the rule that if a cause can
be decided without passing on the constitutional question, such question will
not be considered, there is another well-known rule applicable to the case,
namely, that when one interpretation of a statute will make it unconstitutional, whereas another will make it valid, the court will give the latter if
it can do so without straining the words and evident intent of the legislature. Upon this ground the dissenting justices contended that the ordinance
should be construed as giving the mayor no discretion in the matter.
NscuGSNC$-DU'l'Y TowAIID INFANT ~SPASSSRS-A'l"l'RAC'l'IVS NurSANCl!S.-Defendant caused certain ex'cavations to be made on his premises.
Plaintiff's child, playing with others around the excavation, was killed when
the walls caved. In an actioI). for damages it was alleged that the excavation
was eight feet deep in sandy soil; that defendant knew that because of the
nature of the soil a cave-in might occur at any time; that he knew the premises to be attractive to playing children; that he knew that children played
there, and yet he took no precautions to guard them from danger or to
warn them. Defendant demurred. Held, demurrer should be overruled.
Baxter v. Park, (S. D., 1921), 184 N. W-. 198.

II8

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

It is a time-honored doctrine that a property owner owes no duty to
trespassers other than to avoid wilfully injuring them. He is under no
obligation to keep his premises safe for them. · But many courts recognize
as an exception to this doctrine that one who maintains dangerous instrumentalities on his premises, with the knowledge that they are likely to
attract children at play and that the danger wi).1 be latent to their childish
intellects, owes them the duty of guarding or at least of warning them of
the danger. The English case, Lynch v. Nitrdin, (1841), I Q. B. 29, was the
pioneer case pronouncing this exception. In 1873 the U. S. Supreme Court
followed by applying the new doctrine to a case of injuries caused by a
railroad turntable, allowing the infant plaintiff to recover, even. though he
was a trespasser. Railroad v. Stmit, 17 Wall. 657. _Since then hundreds of
cases have raised the question. Many courts have sanctioned the -doctrine,
others have disapproved it, and others have subjected it to a storm of criticism. An exhausti~e analysis of the subject and a citation of cases appears
in 19 L. R A. (N. S.) I094. and the problem is discussed in IS MICH. L.
RJ;v. 340, and 5 MICH. L. Riw. 64- Specific cases have been noted as they
were decided in numerous other issues of this Riwn~w. The modern tendency, however, seems to be to restrict the application of the doctrine. Some
courts refuse to apply it in any case. Reid v. Harm01i, 16! Mich. 51. Some
limit it strictly to the turntable cases. Railway v. Beavers, II3 Ga. 3g8.
Others limit it to cases involving attractive and dangerous machinery or explosives. Erickson v. Great Northern R. R., 82 Minn. 60. It is generally said
that the danger must be latent to the child, although patent to the property
owner, to impose the duty on the latter, and some courts limit the doctrine
by imputing to the· child a marvelous perspicacity in discerning danger. But
some few courts, such as the court in the principal case, adopt the doctrine
whole-heartedly and compel all property owners to exercise ordinary care
to guard infant trespassers. In view of the increasing number of attractive
artificial perils which have been devised by twentieth century ingenuity, the
doctrine is surely a salutary one, and since the principal case is apparently
the first case in which the South Dakota court has followed the doctrine of
Lynch v. Nitrdin, it jg to be commended for coming into the column of courts
which plac~ modem social considerations above technical property rights.

Ou, AND GAS-NATURE OF INTtREST HELD BY LESSEE.-In determining the
amount of tax due under a statute, it became necessary to decide whether
an oil and gas lease which "granted, demised, leased, and let land for the
sole purpose of operating for oil and ias" gave the lessee corporeal propertY.
The Secretary of State excluded such oil leaseholds on the ground that they
were incorporeal property. In an action in the form of an injunction against
the Secretary of State to restrain him from turning over to the treasurer
taxes paid under protest, it was held, that such a lease conveys a freehold
interest in the realty and is corporeal property. Transc01itinental Oil Co. v.
E111111erso1~, Secretary of State, (Ill., l92I), l3I N. E. 645.
Courts of the various states are in confHct in their holdings as to the
nature of the interest created by an oil and gas lease. First, it. should be
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noted that there are two principal types of oil and gas leases: that type which
in terms grants the exclusive right to explore for -0il; and secondly, that
which grants the land for the sole purpose of searching for oil. The Illinois
cases, with which the principal case is in accord, hold that under either type
of cases the lessee holds corporeal property. Daughetee v. Ohio Oil Co., 263
Ill. 5I8; Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. IOI. See also Woodland Oil Co. v. Crawford, 55 Ohio St. I61; Harris v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. u8. Kansas, like
Illinois, makes no distinction in the types of leases, but contrary to Illinois,
holds that, regardless of the type of lease, incorporeal property is created.
Beardsley v. Kati. Nat. Gas Co., 78 Kan. 57I; Huston v. Cox, 103 Kan. 73.
Pennsylvania and California hold that a lease, which in terms grants the
land, vests the lessee with a corporeal estate. Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co.,
225 Pa. 338; Chandler v. Hart, 16I Cal. 405. But the rule is settled in these
two states that if the lease purports to grant only the exclusive right to
search for oil, then the lessee has an incorporeal right. Funk v. Haldeman,
53 Pa. 229; Brookshire Oil Co. v. Casmalia Oil Co., 156 Cal. 2n. The courts,
in determining the nature of the interest created by an oil and gas lease,
should consider the substance rather than the form of the lease. Whatever
the technical form, the underlying purpose of the lease is to give the lessee
the right to take oil and gas. All other rights are mere incidents of this
primary, underlying right. The right to take oil is analagous to the right
to take gravel, herbage, seaweed, etc., from the land of another-commonly
termed a profit a prendre. If this analysis is correct, the Kansas courts
have reached the sound conclusion in holding that an oil lease, regardless of
its form, creates in the lessee incorporeal property. For a more complete
review of the cases upon the nature of the lessee's interest under an oil and
gas lease, see the article on The Law of Oil and Gas, by James A. Veasey,
18 MICH. L. R£v. 749.
RESTRIC'tioNs-GeNERAr, Bun.nmG PLAN-UN!FOR:M STYI.E oF Houses

AS

NoTICE.-The owner of a tract of land laid. the same out in lots in pursuance to a community scheme and sold them under certain restrictions and
the representation that the whole tract was subject to them. One of these
was to the effect that any dwelling erected should be used as a private home
for one family only. Later he sold a lot to the defendant under a deed
restricting the latter to the erection of a building to appear from the outside
as a one-family house, to be used by not .more than two families. The defendant began to erect a two-family type of house. Seven of the restricted lot
owners sued to enjoin him from so doing. Held, the nature of the building
restriction imposed on him and the uniformity of the houses in the restricted
area were circumstances sufficient to put a reasonable man on inquiry, and
hence to charge the defendant with notice of the general plan. Shoyer et al.
v. Mer111elstei1i, (Ct. of Chancery, N. J., I92I), 114 Atl. 788.
It is well settled that an owner of land may, by contract with the purchasers of successive parcels, affect the remaining parcels with an equity
requiring them to be occupied in conformity to a general plan, provided that
each subsequent purchaser is charged with notice of the plan, and regardless
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of the fact that his legal title is not similarly restricted. See 2 TIFFANY,
~AL PRuPER'rY, [2nd Ed.], Sec. 400; Tallmadge v. East Rwer Bank, 26 N.
Y. 105; Knapp v. Hall, 20 N. Y. Supp. 42; Lowrance v. Woods, 54 Tex. Civ.
App. 233; ChaPi1i v. Dougherty, 165 Ill. App. 426; Allen v. Detroit, 167 Mich.
464. Naturally, the courts cannot define precisely what circumstances will
be adequate to put a purchaser upon inquiry as to the existence of a general
plan. In Tallmadge v. East River Bank, supra, the court said, "The uniformity of the position of all the houses on St. Mark's Place was probably
sufficient alone to put the defendant on inquiry," and in the principal case
the court said, "That (the uniform style of the houses) alone was, in >.'ly
judgment, enough to put the defendant to inquiry." In both of these cases,
however, there were other facts indicating the existence of a general plan.
In Bradley v. Walker, 138 N. Y. 291, where the buildings in the restricted
area were generally set back eight feet from the street, though parts of some
of them encroached upon the space to be left open, the court said, regarding
their uniform position, "But he (the defendant) was not bound to know
from that circumstance that there was any binding agreement in reference
to the open space." It is doubtful whether mere uniformity in style or in
position should be sufficient to charge a party with notice of a general building plan. A better rule would seem to be that the uniformity of the houses
in a restricted area is but one of the circumstances to be considered in determining whether a reasonable man would have been put upon inquiry. Uniformity in style or position might be so distinct as to have this effect.
SALES-FORM OF ACTION ON BUYER'S ~FUSAL OF Trri.t.-Plaintiff sued
on an account for goods sold. At the trial defendant was permitted to introduce evidence that he had countermanded his order for the goods before
plaintiff had shipped them. This was objected to by plaintiff on the ground
that by the contract the order could not be countermanded and the evidence
was therefore immaterial. Held, the evidence was properly admitted. Ma~
tin & Lanier Paint Co. v. Daniels, (Ga. App., 1921), 108 S. E. 246.
The court's reason for admitting the evidence was that "while the order
for the goods sold provided that it was not subject to countermand, "yet if
the defendant did in fact countermand it before the goods were shipped,
while this would not relieve him from liability, the plaintiff could not maintain an action upon an open account for goods sold and delivered, but would
have to sue for a breach of contract." The court cites no authority, but the
facts and decision are on all fours with Acme Food Co. v. Older, 64 W. Va.
255. It is one more decision in disregard of the persistent dictum originated
in Dustan v. McA11drew, 44 N. Y. 72, to the effect that even though the
buyer refuses the title the seller may, nevertheless, sue for the price as distinct from damages for breach of the contract. For a full discussion of the
subject, see The Seller's Action for the Price, 17. MICH. L. ~v. 283.
STATU'l'ORY CoNSTRUCTION-~ADING ExctPTION IN'l'O PENAL STATUTE.The defendant, who was a motorcycle police officer, while pursuing a speedlaw violator, ran into the plaintiff. The defendant was exceeding the speed
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limit and running without a light, in violation of the Minnesota Motor
Vehicle Act. In a civil action for damages, held, defendant was not guilty
of negligence per se. Edberg v. John-son, (Minn., 1921), 184 N. W. 12.
The statute involved applied to all vehicles not driven by muscular power,
except fire department apparatus and police patrol wagons. The court concluded that motorcycle policemen should be classed with drivers of police
patrol wagons, since they regarded it as unreasonable that the legislature
would have intended that the prohibitions of the statute should apply to a
motorcycle police officer who was exceeding the speed limit from necessity
in the performance of his duty. While this is obviously a decision based
upon good policy, it appears a very liberal construction of the exceptions
provided by the statute. Opposed to it, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals
held a deputy sheriff guilty of negligence per se when he injured himself
by running into an obstruction while exceeding the speed limit in pursuit
of a speeder. The court admitted that the statute should not affect the
officer, but stated that only the legislature had power to ingraft the exception. Keevil v. Ponsford, (Texas, 1915), 173 S. W. 518. It has been held
that chronic addiction to drugs creating symptoms similar to drunkenness
would not furnish grounds for divorce under a statute which granted divorce
for drunkenness. Smith v. Smith, (Del., 1919), 105 Atl. 833, 19 Cor,. L. Rsv.
412. Similarly, the court refused to insert the word "not" into a statute
purporting to regulate the elevation of the beam of light which could be
thrown from the headlights of automobiles, when this recourse was necessary to give effect to the legislature's obvious intention. State v. Claiborne,
(Iowa, 1919), 170 N. W. 417, 17 MICH. L. Rsv. 519. These cases illustrate
what is said to be the modern attitude of the courts toward statutes: that is,
to try not to deviate from the expressed intention of the legislature, as distinguished from the earlier "equitable construction," which often went so
far as to corre~t the legislative intention to accord with what, in the view
of the court, should have been the intention. See 58 U. PA. L. R 76-86.
Some modern cases, however, look further than _the literal meaning of a
statute, and inquire into the conditions existing at the time of its enactment,
and the evil sought to be remedied, in order to arrive at the whole legislative
intent. The United States Supreme Court held that Trinity Church in New
York, in contracting for the services of a pastor living in England, did not
violate the Contract Labor Law. The theory of the court was that, although
the statute contained no exception in that regard, still Congress would not
have intended that a law which must have been aimed primarily at foreign
contracts for laborers should include a contract with a minister, especially
since the policy of the law in this country had always been to foster and
encourage religion. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457.
An act making it a misdemeanor wilfully to break down a fence in the possession of another did not apply to a man who had a legal right to the fence
and the land on which it stood. State v. Clark, 29 N. J. Law ¢. A deputy
sheriff who exceeded the speed limit set by a municipal ordinance, while pursuing a felon, was held not subject to prosecution. State of Washingto1i v.
Gorham, no Wash. 330, 9 A. L. R. 365. In many cases it is said that a
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statute should be interpreted in the light -0£ sound public policy and reasonableness, whenever the intention of the legislature is in doubt, because of
ambiguity, or where a strict and literal construction would lead to an absurd
result. Mitchell v. Lowden, 288 Ill. 327; Bowman v. Industrial Commission,
(1919), 28g Ill. 126. The leading case is in harmony -with these decisions
and seems progressive, although it is inconsistent with some other cases.
UNFAIR CoMPETITlON-ScoPE oF POWERS oF FEDERAL TRADE CoMMISSION
-DECEPTION OF CONSUMERS NOT UNFAIR COMPE'l'ITION.-A manufacturer of
underwear, shirts and hosiery labeled these articles as composed of "wool"
and "merino," when they contained much cotton. While this deceived the
public, it did not deceive competing manufacturers, among whom such labels
were used universally. The Federal Trade Commission, after a hearing,
ordered the company to desist and to label its goods as "wool and cotton"
or "merino and cotton." Upon petition to revise the order, held, the commission acted without authority and order should be reversed. Winsted
Hosiery Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, (C. C. A., 2nd Circ., 1921), 272
Fed. 957.
The common law has afforded no protection simitar to that which the
Federal Trade Commission attempted to provide by their order. A handbook prepared by the Federal Trade Commission for office use classifies the
methods of competition which the courts have passed upon as to unfairness.
They include the following: passing off of goods for those of competitor;
inducing breach of competitor's contracts; intimidating a competitor's customers by threats to sue for infringements of patents; enticing employes
from the service of competitor; defamation of competitor or disparagement
of his goods; combinations to cut off competitor's supplies; betrayal of trade·
secrets; and contracts for exclusive dealing. UNFAIR COMPETITION AT THE
COMMON ~w, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION R.EPoRT, (1916). It is seen that
none of these include deception of the consumer by false labeling, and the
only remedy for such an injury has been the private action for fraud. The
scope of the authority of the Federal Trade Commission, however, is determined by the statute, and' is not limited by precedents in common law and
equity. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 258 Fed. 307.
Section V, Federal Trade Commission Act, reads as follows: "That unfair
methods of competition in commerce are hereby declared unlawful. The
commission is hereby empowered and directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks and common carriers, from using unfair
methods of competition in commerce," and the commission is to hold a hearing and issue an order to desist whenever it "shall have reason to believe
that any person, partnership, or corporation has been using any unfair method
of competition in commerce, and if it shall appear to the commission that
a proceeding in respect thereof would be of interest to the public." 4 FED.
STAT. ANN. 577. The decision confines the proceedings of the commission
to those practices which are not employed generally by all competing traders.
and which injure other traders by depriving them of an equal opportunity
of disposing of their goods. The court applies the traditional conception
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of unfair competition, reasoning that the purpose of the act was to protect
competing traders, and was not to constitute the Federal Trade Commission
a censor of commercial morals. The Federal Trade Commission Act was
made general, however, with the aim that it might be flexible and enable
the commission to act to the best advantage. A broader construction of its
purpose would seem reasonable. It would seem that unfair competition
could reasonably be construed to include any methods by which competing
traders seek to obtain business for themselves and which deceive the public
to their injury. In the Sears, Roebuck & Co. case, cited above, the company was ordered to desist from advertising untruthfully that it was able
to give lower prices on sugar than competitors because of its exclusive enjoyment of certain markets. This order, it is seen, prohibits as unfair competition a practice which was never held to be such before the Federal Trade
Commission Act. In the leading case some reliance was placed upon a
decision by the Supreme Court that it was not unfair competition to refuse
to sell cotton ties, the company having control of the market for ties, unless
the customer also purchased cotton bagging. Federal Tracie Commissio1i v.
Gratz, (1920), 253 U. S. 421. The acts complained of were judged as to
their unfairness from the standpoint of the crowding out of other companies. This case did not involve a direct deception of customers as to the
quality of goods purchased, and the leading case is the first to decide whether
the commission could prevent this practice. It is clear that such a general
practice of deception as was involved in the leading case is of genuine
interest to the public. It should be prevented. Certiorari for review of the
case has been granted. 41 Sup. Ct. 625. If the decision is sustained upon
review, further legislation appears desirable.
WNtEP.s AND WATERCOURSES-RIPARIAN LAND-WA'l'EP.SHED.-Of three
adjoining tracts of land bordering on a stream, plaintiff, a municipality,
owned tract B, with a prescriptive right to divert all of the waters of the
stream. Defendant, owning tract C, abutting on the stream below and
extending behind the plaintiff's land, acquireq a small strip of tract A, the
uppermost tract, which strip bordered on the stream and was contiguous to
her other land, tract C. Water was diverted from th~ stream at tract A for
the use of a dwelling house situated on tract C. In a suit to enjoin
such diversion, held, that tract C was not riparian to that portion of the
stream opposite tract A and that such diversion was wrongful. Towii of
Gorclo1isville v. Zi1111, (Va., 1921), ro6 S. E. 5o8.
The cases are in conflict with regard to the extent of riparian land away
from the stream~ According to one view represented by Anaheim U11io1i
Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, land to be riparian to a stream must lie
within the watershed thereof and extend in a continuous tract to the stream
bank. rr L. R A. (N. S.) ro6z, 9 Ann. Cas. 1236.
"The principal reason for the rule confining riparian rights to that
part of the lands bordering on a stream which are within the watershed is that where water is used on such land it will, after such use,
return to the stream, so far as it is not consumed, and that as the rain-
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fall on such land feeds the stream, the land is in consequence entitled,
so to speak, to the use of the waters." Anaheim Union Water Co. v.

F1'1ler, supra.
In direct conflict to the preceding, it has been held that all lands belonging
to one owner, irrespective of the time and manner of their acquisition, are
riparian if any part borders on a watercourse. Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30,
approved in Clark v. Allamaii, 7I Kan. 2o6. The principal case adopts the
first view, with the qualification, however, that it is not sufficient that land,
to be riparian, lie within the general watershed, but it is necessary that the
land be within the specific watershed of that portion of the stream to which
it is claimed to be riparian. The substantial question in the case is one of
priorities. and the court might well have treated a decision of the question
of what are "riparian" lands as immaterial and have held, as a matter of
principle, that the defendant was not to be permitted to nullify the effect
of the plaintiff's senior right through the acquisition of a small strip of land
above the plaintiff.
WILr.s-GIFT 'ro SUBSCRIBING WITNJ>Ss.-One of the two subscribing wit~
nesses to a will was also a beneficiary. A statute made all gifts to a subscribing witness void unless there were two other competent witnesses to
the will. Several bystanders, who had been present when testator executed
the instrument, were introduced as witnesses to the will and were able to
testify to the facts of testator's signature in conformity with the statute.
Held, the term "witness to a will" has a well-settled meaning, and means
one who has attested the will by subscribing his name thereto. In re Johnso1{s Estate, (Wis., I92I), I83 N. W. 888.
Some authorities hold that attestation to a will does not require subscription by a witness. Swift v. Wiley, I B. Mon. II4; Tobin v. Haack, 79
Minn. IOI. But the weight of authority is that attestation includes the act
of subscription. Calkins v. Calkins, 2I6 Ill. 458. Under a statute requiring
a will to be in writing and "witnessed" by two witnesses, it has been held
that the witnesses should subscribe the will. In re Boyeies> Will, 23 Ia. 354In Pennsylvania, where the statute requires proof of the signature of the
testator by at least two competent witnesses, subscription to the will is not
necessary to make it valid. In re Irvine's Estat~ 2o6 Pa. I. The principal
case is in accord with the weight of authority where this question has been
presented. Yet no case requires that the subscribing witnesses be summoned
to prove the will, or that it fail without them or upon their disputing its
authenticity. The probate of a will duly executed does not depend on the
lives of the witnesses, their recollection of the facts, or their truthfulness;
any evidence is competent which tends to prove the legal execution of the
instrument. Lyons v. Va.ii Riper, 26 N. J. Eq. 337; fa re Clafliti's Will, 73
Vt. I29. The evidence of subscribing witnesses is entitled to no greater credence than that of others having an equal opportunity to know the facts
on issues of sanity, undue influence, and the like. PAGE ON WILr.s, Sec. 366;
Higginbotham v. Higginbotham, Io6 Ala. 3I4; McTaggart v. Thompson, I4
Pa. St. I49· The requirement of subscribing witnesses is for purposes of
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more readily identifying the will as genuine. Appeal of Canada, 47 Conn.
450; Pollock v. Glassell, 2 Gratt. 439. In view of the fact that under common law rules of evidence a will might be established or overthrown by the
testimony of witnesses other than the subscribing witnesses, it would not
seem unreasonable to say that the term "competent'' witness, as used in this
statute, need not have been construed to mean a subscribing witness. A dissenting opinion distinguishes between competent witnesses and competent
subscribing witnesses, and maintains that the legislature had used the term
"competent" witness purposely, not meaning thereby a subscribing witness.
Since the present statute was an amendment of a previous one in which
the term "competent subscribing'' witness was used, this contention seems
the more forceful. The majority opinion characterized this omission as
being legislative inadvertence. While sheer weight of precedent supports
the decision, the rule of In re Irvine's Estate, supra, and the dissent in the
principal case seem to have reason with them.
WILLS-TESTATOR CoMP~LED To MAKE A WILL-PROOF OF ANIMUS

Tus'l'ANDL-An instrument, sufficient in form to constitute a duly executed
will, was offered for probate. The purported will was found in the archives
of the Masonic Order. Testimony showed that thirteen years prior to his
death deceased executed the instrument while there was being conferred on
him a degree of the secret order mentioned, and that the making of the will
was a part of the ceremony required of all candidates who had not theretofore made a will. Held, deceased executed the instrument intending it to
be his will. bi re Watkins' Estate, (Wash., 1921), 198 Pac. 721.
An instrument to be a will must fulfill two requirements : it must be
executed in accordance with the requirements of the statute; and the testator,
at the time he executed it, must have had the animus testandi. There is no
question in the principal case as to the former requirement, but the question
is raised as to the latter-whether there is present the animus testandi when
one is compelled to make a will, but is left free as to its provisions. In a
North Carolina case decided in 1920 the deceased did not want to make a
will, but the family physician informed him that he could not recover and
compelled him to make one. Evidence showed that the deceased was uninfluenced as to its provisions. It was held that the instrument expressed the
will of the testator and was therefore valid, even though executed under
compulsion. There was a strong dissenting opinion, however, wherein it
was argued that the undue influence used in getting the deceased to execute
the instrument kept it from being his will. In re Lowe's Will, 104 S. E. 143.
The decision in the principal case turns upon the question as to the amount
of proof required to establish whether or not the instrument expresses the
will of the testator. In establishing lack of animus testandi, the same rule
governs as in establishing undue influence. The general rule is that the
burden is upon the contestants. Egan v. Ega1rs Ex'r, 189 Ky. 332; Burke
v. Burke, 184 N. Y. Supp. 673; Quaratiello v. Di Biasi, (R. I., 1921), n2 At!.
215; Lister v. Smith, 3 Swabey & T. 282. In Roe v. Duty, (Wash., 1921),
197 Pac. 47, it is held: "In the contest of a will for undue influence, :the
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testimo~y to overcome the will must be cogent and convincing." A Missis•
sippi case, in 1921, however, takes the opposite view as to the burden of
proof, holding that when due execution and mental capacity are proved the
proponents make out a prima facie case. When the contestants bring in
evidence of undue influence, the burden of proof is upon the proponents to
produce a preponderance of evidence. Isom v. Canedy, (Miss., 1921), 88 So.
485. The testimony in the principal case is sufficient fo uphold the will even
under the rule of the Mississippi case, for in the majority opinion it is said:
"It remains to inquire whether the testator intended the instrument to be
his will and testament. The evidence on the question is somewhat meagre, but
we think the decided weight of evidence is that he so regarded it." But the
dissenting opinion is not satisfied with even the rule of the Mississippi case
requiring the proponents to produce a preponderance of evidence: "Mere
preponderance of evidence should not be sufficient; the evidence should be
such as to clearly, convincingly, and satisfactorily establish the intention."
No authority is cited for this proposition and it is submitted that such a
rule goes beyond the holding of decided cases.
WITNESSES-CROSS-EXAMINATION-PREVIOUS ARREsT AND CONVICTION AS
AFFECTING CREDIBILITY.-ln a pedestrian's action for injuries against an automobile owner the defendant was asked on cross-examination whether he had
ever been arrested and convi~ed. Held, admissible on the issue of his
credibility, the court saying that in determining the weight to be given his
testimony the jury had a right to know what manner of man he had been.
Van Goosen v. Barlimi. (Mich., 1921), 183 N. W. 8.
The rule of the common law was that persons convicted of treason,
felony, and the cri111e1i. falsi were rendered infamous, and were disqualified
as witnesses. In determining whether the crime was infamous the test
seems to be "whether the crime shows such depravity in the perpetration,
or such a disposition to pervert public justice in the courts, as creates a
violent presumption against his truthfulness under oath." Smith v. State,
129 Ala. 89. This disqualification has now, of course been removed by
statute, but conviction of some crimes is everywhere conceded to be admissible for the purpose of impeachment. However, due to statutes and difference in judicial opinion, the authorities are not in harmony as to what
convictions may be shown for this purpose. Some cases hold that the conviction must be for a crime of an infamous character. Matzenbaugh v.
People, 194 III. 108; State v. Randolph, 24 Conn. 363; Williams v. State, 144
Ala. 14. Sometimes a distinction seems to be drawn as t6 whether a misdemeanor involves moral turpitude or not. Wheeler v. Stat.e, 4 Ga. App. 325;
Hightower v. State (Tex.), 165 S. W. 184 The tendency, however. is to
simplify the rule defining the kinds of crime and make it all crimes or
felonies, thus doing away with the subtleties of the common law. W1GMORE
ON EVIDENCE, Vol. 2, Sec. g87. The Michigan court seems to define crime
as meaning all criminal offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors. It
seems difficult to see how conviction for some misdemeanors would throw
light on a witness's credibility, but such a rule is upheld, perhaps, on the
theory that if he has been guilty of violation of law he might be more apt
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to violate his oath. At all events, the matter rests largely within the discretion of the trial court, and a wide latitude is allowed in Michigan to
afford a full inquiry into the history of the witness in order to illustrate
his true character. Wilbitr v. Flood, 16 Mich. 41; A<niold v. Nye, 23 Mich.
286. The doctrine of these early cases has been quite consistently adhered
to in this state in the matter of interrogating witness as to his conviction
of crimes.

a

WoRKMSN's Co:MPSNSA't10N-AccmEN'TAL INJURY.-A robust city fireman was called out to fight a fire on a bitterly cold day. He worked steadily
for six and one-half hours. During that period he fought two stubborn
fires with insufficient men. Expert evidence proved that the layer of ice
one inch thick which formed at the back of his neck caused a contraction
of the muscles, displacing the axis and at las vertebrae, producing pressure
on the spinal cord, resulting in paralysis and death. Held (two judges dissenting), death was not due: to accidental injury. Savage v. City of Po11tiac,
Mich., 1921), 183 N. W. 7g8.
Conceding that courts have not yet found an entirely satisfactory definition of accident, in both England and the United States they have quite gen·
erally agreed that the word must be interpreted according to its ordinary
and popular meaning, and they have defined it as m~ m1looked-for or ii11toward eve11t which was t1ot expected or desig1wd~ Fenton v. Thorley, [1903],
A. C. 443; Brfatons v. Turvey, [1905], A. C. 230; Bryant v. Piss.ell, (1913),
84 N. J. L. 72; Boody v. K. & C. Mfg. Co., (1914), 77 N. H. 208. The English and American cases generally hold that where the exposure is more
than ordinary for that sort of employment, or where the other conditions vary
from the normal in that employment so as to make it more hazardous, an
injury resulting therefrom is an accidental injury. Where a miner died as
a result of a chill contracted by reason of being required to stand in cold
wate11 up to his knees for twenty-five minutes, death was due to an accident.
Alloa Coal Co. v. Drylie, (1913), W. C. & Ins. Rep. 213. Where, by reason
of his boat; overturning, a pilot got wet up to the thighs and contracted sciatica, it was held that he was injured by accident. Barbeary v. Chugg, (1915),
84 L. J. K. B. N. S. 504 Prostration by sunstroke may be found to be an
accident. Morgati v. The Zenaida, (1919), 25 Times L. R. 446. Death resulting from a heat-stroke has been held to be an accident, even though the
work of a trimmer on a steamship would naturally expose the workman to
intense heat. Ismay v. Williamson, [1go8], A. C. 437. A workman employed
to cut grass along -a railroad right-of-way suffered an accidental injury when
he died from poison ivy infection. Plass v. Central New E11gla11d R. Co., (1915),
155 N. Y. Supp. 854 Where the employe is injured by a frostbite. the more
recent cases would allow recovery for an injury by accident. Days v. S.
Trimmer & Sons, (1916), 162 N. Y. Supp. 603; Nikkicziek v. McArthur,
(Alberta, 1916), 28 D. L. R. 279.
It must be clear that in some of the cases considered above there was
nothing extraordinary about the conditions of employment, and in others
the deviation from the normal exposure for that particular employment was
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very little. In a Michigan case, La Veck v. Parke, Davis & Co., 190 Mich.
6o4, the facts were that a workman died from slow paralysis due to cerebral
hemorrhage. The high temperature of the room in which he worked induced
an increase in blood pressure which resulted in the rupture of a small blood
vessel in the brain. The court there held that death was due to an accidental
injury, and allowed recovery. The court said, "Mr. La Veck intended to do
the prolonged work which the situation demanded, but he did not anticipate
that because of doing so his blood pressure would be so increased as to
result in the rupture of a cerebral blood vessel." Could not the court have
said in the principal case that Mr. Savage intended to do the prolonged work
which the situation demanded, but he did not antiCipate that because of
doing so the muscular contraction due to the formation of ice on his neck
would dislocate the axis and atlas vertebrae, producing paralysis? A clear
analysis of these two cases will reveal that the situations and causative factors are substantially alike in both. Upon both reason and authority, the
principal case seems wrongly decided. In the matter of finding a reasonable
guide for determining when an accident has been sustained, the Michigan
Supreme Court has been peculiarly unsuccessful. See La Veck v. Parke,
Davis & Co., supra; Roach v. Kelsey Wheel Co., 200 Mich. 299; Tackles v.
Bryant & Detwiler Co., 200 Mich. 350; Guthrie v. Detroit Shipbuildinq Co.,.
200 Mich. 355.

